It may appear dull and ridiculous to write about political correctness after all said in the earlier writings; the problem was thoroughly dissected (though, really only implicitly) when the ideals of multinationalism, the right/duty of political choice were addressed. Can’t remember the titles of these writings any more, still less their details; so apologies to the readers for rehearsing the same tune. It is the stubborn persistence of this perverted concept (a tool in fact, poisonous bait, as this text will hopefully show) in the parlance of circles that struggle against the dominant system’s practices and ideology, that incited this re-action. It feels embarrassing, banal to explain the obvious; worse still, being re-action driven, basically a reply, the following discussion steadily appropriates the aura of some serial, columnist type of criticism. A criticism of the worst kind, as understood by journalists or the so called political analysts. It is the nightmare of the “Venomous Ideals” project, to absorb the disgusting smell emanating from the thick mass of casual, day-to-day criticisms that crowd all public communication. Nor it aims to manifest its authors in the pathetic light of being alone against the basic, unanimously accepted values of the day. This projects strives to be no more but an observatory station, a tele-microscope, to stay firm against the heavy flow of quickly cooked opinions, attitudes, points of view…It will rather review, re-consider, repeat, run in circles than pursue the mantle of novelty by any price. Praise to our amnesia, disorganization, for it forces us to look time and again, to constantly redefine and question our horizons.
What has the East to do with political correctness, in the first place? The term appeared in the “far West”, during the last decades of the past century1, in a very different and distant social setting. It was meaningless, with absolutely no appeal for the homogenous nation-state societies of the East, with no, or very brief history of colonialism, no immigration problems…Political correctness was seen as either a too distant goal, a policy applicable only for advanced democracies, or dismissed by certain circles, as unnecessary and ridiculous. (Not surprisingly there is a great similarity with how western conservatives dismiss the idea.) But political correctness is thousands of miles far from the East, only if perceived in its “original, westernized” context. Understood it as a general policy, or simply an issue of public speech, “political correctness” is nothing new; it wasn’t unfamiliar to the socialist regimes, and it played its part in the monarchies that preceded them. It certainly looks ridiculous and ephemeral, when implemented by completely copying the practice as it is in its western context. However with regards to function, the East had/s analogous, “aboriginal”, and often very keen concepts. The writer is not equipped for telling the history of this idea in a certain part of the eastern world; historic examples are in any case more often than not, very ambiguous and dumb. The aim is to search for the springing point of this ideal, the “mind”, the ambient that generated/s it; to try and answer the question of why every governing regime needs to be correct and just, at least to a certain degree.
What is the “function” of political correctness? Why are the ones in power constantly driven to constrain their superiority? Political correctness has much to do with the way power is traditionally understood in main-stream, established, as well as, renegade circles. As some philosophers have observed more than a century before, power has always been perceived as an exclusive prerogative, as owned by some and expropriated from others; the empowered and the disempowered. There is a two-fold operation underlining this conception: first, power is objectified, reduced to something that can be possessed or lost by a certain agent; secondly, (and consequently) it is an attribute that creates bi-polarity. There are agents that have power and agents that lack power. This idea, vulgarly lazy and simple, sums the great majority of perspectives on the principles of the reigning regimes. But its implications quickly lead to a theoretical dead-end. If oppressive relations are simply explained as springing from a strictly bi-polar system, the paradox of exercising power over the disempowered emerges. How can a relation to a something or someone with zero power, null degree of energy be qualified as oppressive? If power is exclusively reserved for a minority of agents, wherefrom the need for oppression; against what? There is further, the question of socio-political dynamics; the roughly sketched point of view, leaves no room for change and variety in the socio-political relations. It generates a picture of frozen, eternal and universal state of affairs; one which is so much alike the images produced in the ideologies of all political regimes, ever since the most ancient times.
Modern social and political theory has long abandoned this simplistic perspective, but like with so many other issues it has barely modified, refined its severest, its least attainable aspects. Power is no longer in the constant possession of concrete social agents, but an abstract quality shared to a varying degree by all members of society. Oppressive relations or regimes are thus explained as resulting from an inequality of power distribution, rather than as a sharp contrast between those with and those without power. Power is still something that can be appropriated, a single, universal quality. Agents remain divorced from power, so they can win or lose it, the familiar concept of power negotiation. Power is in essence equaled with social, political or economic status and influence, it is not something intrinsic to the agent, or rather to a constellation of intrinsically empowered agents.
Since power is treated as an abstract and universal quality, and since its fluidity has been admitted, it turns out that it can flow in one direction only; that is, from the more powerful to the less powerful. (In theory, in contemporary democratic regimes exactly the opposite is true, but the actual fallacy of democratic transactions has already been the subject of an earlier essay.) Minorities (agents defined on the grounds of the degree of power in which they enjoy) can only be empowered through the recognition and allowance of those in power. And so again, a very old ideological trick is being revoked: equality and justice stem from the mercy and the prudence of the rich and the kings. It is by the means of their wisdom and nobility, their good will and love(?!) that power is redistributed to the people.
But this thread of thought still fails to answer the opening question of this discussion. Why are those in power obliged to “redistribute” their riches, to give up their potentials from time to time? For the sake of love and mercy!? It is because their status and their wealth (erroneously substituted for power) is never secure once and for all; status and wealth are dispossesible attributes constantly fought over by numerous, intrinsically empowered agents or coalitions of agents, at every level of society, in every social situation. Societies are in a constant state of inner struggle; they are constituted by numerous, instable and struggling agents; “a resultant of conflicting powers”, as said in an earlier writing. There never is, and never was a pristine state of balance, a settlement, from which all rights and riches can be derived (except, of course, in the images produced by the reigning ideologies). Codes of law, codes of morality are therefore constantly being changed; new techniques and knowledges are being promoted and presented to the masses; language, in particular, the language of public speech is endlessly being modified and refined. These are the zillions of incessant tiny battles that replaced the single massive tension, supposed to generate a great, revolutionary clash in the social theories of the 19th, and the early 20th century. They are constitutive of all societies. It is very important for the moment to conceive of societies as fluid and fertile conglomerates, extremely unstable composites that can grow almost monolithic and then, suddenly, revert to a state of incomprehensible, bewildering constellation of allying-clashing agents. (The genesis story of the old Mesopotamian religions give an incredibly vivid picture of the proposed concept; the primordial mass is the womb of the Mother of all gods, where everything that’ll ever be, everything good and evil reposes. Eventually a fierce battle commences; gods and monsters of many generations ally in two blocks, involving the Mother, who cannot stand the clamor in her intestines, in the battle. Finally, one of the parties, the younger generation of gods, wins the war; the Mother’s womb is cut open, and a new regime is established.) Normally, the chief worry of a governing regime in such situation is to manage its constitutive conflicts, to neutralize the constant strain and prevent social disintegration.
History and political sciences have recognized few ways (strategies) in which the regimes respond: they either ally with one of the parties, aiming to destroy the others, or stay neutral, with the aim of marginalizing, stifling the conflict. Further on, it either leads a restrictive, “sterilizing” policy with regards to the proliferation of various tiny agents (groups, movements, cliques), or it encourages their formation in order to prevent a situation where large, cohesive social groups threaten to explode the social entity along with the regime that governs it. Every state is a managerial state; the idea that the old Empires or the former socialist countries existed on the basis of sheer oppression is partly a lie (accepted as mythic true among the masses on the West; and on the East, as well.) They have really died off through a too little sense for, or because of, bad management; but to claim that their only mean was outright oppression is simply not true.
Political correctness is a tool of one of the mentioned strategies of conflict management. It is a tool of the regime that has chosen to stay neutral, aside and above the internal strains. It keeps an awaken eye, but it refuses to get involved more deeply. In essence, political correctness is a method of suspension, as if the governing parties were not sure how to respond immediately; it’s impossible to tell which of the offsprings will be favored at the very beginning. Time will best show which tendencies will overtake certain groups, where certain roads of thought and behavior lead. Political correctness is also a method of neutralization and marginalization; a very characteristic attitude of all modern, democratic regimes. The principle conception behind this strategy is to render the variety of (potentially conflicting) opinions, practices, life-styles a matter of leisure choice, of minor importance. Strong, cohesive and devoted groups (certain religious sects, extreme rightist and leftist movements) are of no good. Strong and certain opinions, codes of behavior that are too strict or too perverted are a bad signal, a sign of a crisis. Nothing that on first glance falls outside the range of issues that concern the regime itself, should be taken too serious. In sum, it is a strategy of waiting and watching, and of forced reconciliation. All social agents are allowed to pursue their interest, to exercise their power, till the point when it becomes dangerous for the principles of the reigning regime. Nothing new; it is easy to recognize the well known strategy of divide and rule. But it is precisely at this point, that the illusion of dis/empowering the constitutive agents of society comes into play: it appears as if the social agents are granted a room for limited agency, when in fact, the exercise of their intrinsic power is simply blocked by the agencies of other social subjects. As the histories of many subcultural, religious or political movements in West has demonstrated, the agency of these subjects is powerful enough to pressure the regime into recognizing and channeling their interest, sooner or later.
It is tempting to try and go a bit further. One can apprehend the logical connection between the strategy of encouraging the creation of many little social groups, organized around various, often extremely banal causes (societies for the legal protection of some characters, various consuming or sport societies), and the strategy of conflict management, through the ethics of political correction. The first strategy aims at exhausting the (potentially destructive, revolutionary) energies in the social body, while the latter serves as a regulator of the process of proliferation, marking and eliminating groups that tend to be renegade or cause unnecessary conflicts. Political correctness as a strategy is directed against those that threaten to cause an intra-social clash, but these are in the same time marked as enemies of the tolerant principles of the regime. This allows the regime to shine in the light of tolerance and absolute justice, while below, zounds of social groups confounded, disoriented pursue their tiny, private goals and interests. The modern western state is proud with the variety of socio-cultural groups it embraces; it is proud as a collector with the richness of its collection, but it’s also proud because it has succeeded in the control of excessive, destructive energy. After work, people go shopping or eating in restaurants, then rest, then spend the few hours left of the day on some in/formal social gathering, or play for their company’s football team. One can also notice why is this strategy so much suitable to modern capitalist societies: the various social agents, whose formation the state favors and often actively supports, give a fake feeling that despite the demands of labor, there is still room for a person to fulfill its appetites, to get compensated for the hours of every day, estranged laboring. People are less unhappy when involved in such groups, “there is less alcoholism, violence, drugs in societies seemingly parceled by thousands of little communities and organizations”, often repeat sociologist. There is in fact, less room for anger, depression, will to crush into bits everything that surrounds us, and turn the back on this society and its values.
Is this a final tendency, one towards which all state societies should be expected to strive? (Recall a recurring theme from the history of the medieval Byzantine society: the problem of controlling monastic movements. The formation of monastic movements, the building of monasteries was a normal practice in this period of the past; it was a practice approved of and appraised by the Church, and the reigning ideology, but it was also acting as a regulator of demographic pressure. Better in monasteries, than wondering the towns as thieves and drunkards, or operating as outlaws in the countryside. The fact that excessive population was under the ecclesiastic umbrella was no guarantee however, and the Byzantine state, will not once, have to demonstrate its power against various monastic movements, often leading real war campaigns. When the demographic tendencies turn the opposite way, when external political or economic conditions press hard on the Empire, a different policy is applied. The expansion of monasteries, the increasing recruitment of monks, the large expenditures for the buildings and furniture, all have to be cut down, for the Emperor needs soldiers, small landowners, ready to pay taxes…) We are talking about shifting, and rather general strategies of control and regulation, not about principles of rule or particular ideologies. The regime applies them according to the actual situation and needs; they are both shifting and universal policies, and one can discover them being applied in various types of regimes, through longer periods of time. Political correctness is a tool of a regime that can afford to lead a policy of non-intervention, that can distance itself in the comfortable ideological alcoves, far away, and yet with a firm control over the parceled social body. It could be taken as an index of the regime’s strength and confidence, but it is not a final destination, a form of strategy awaiting at the end (or the top) of an evolutionary scale. It is not the exquisite attribute of highly advanced societies (whatever this means), as promoted by some political circles. Neither it is the most “reasonable” way of behaving in highly diverse communities; the rational of “not offending the neighbors”, a simple outcome of weighing the costs of collision and coalition, as perceived by groups that have set themselves against the reigning regime. (And this is an interesting example of how a typical strategy of governing and control can tacitly be adopted by communities that claim to fight for liberation: political correctness as the most reasonable, humane or natural path to follow.) The need for politically correct practices arises under certain conditions only and perhaps even, it is directly linked to what was earlier recognized as a general type of demographic strategy. A politics of political correctness, under different circumstances (wars, immigration or social pressures), would be deemed suicidal, in particular by the most powerful regimes, those strong enough to directly suppress internal divisions. It is likewise, not applied universally, at any given moment in a society: there are always certain groups that deserve to be outcasted, excommunicated; the regime must differentiate itself in contrast to some values and principles, it can never be all embracing.
In any instance, political correctness reflects a very conscious, alternative way of guarding social integrity; alternative to direct and immediate qualifications and suppressions. One must separate it from the contemporary conditions in the democracies of the Western World in order to understand its real role and goals. Therefore, a disturbingly suspicious move was made: by analogy, it was attempted to speak about political correctness as a necessary tool of a general type of political strategy, common for western democracies as much as for ancient and medieval Empires. In that sense, political correctness is not even a type of policy exclusively related to state regimes; as a principle, it smoothly applies to any given social entity that tends to unite (and to generate, inside its womb) a diverse mass of agents. In doing so it was tacitly held that the modern regimes present the “inherited”, the immanent to any regime, as something newly invented, as a mark of advanced and superior age. Pity this attempt if it triggers a search for the history of the discussed concept; the least these few pages wanted to achieve was to promote political correctness as a universal and eternal phenomenon, (rediscovered and cherished by our enlightened state regimes.) The idea was to contest the truths of modern ideologies, to reclaim what they stole, to uncover their most favorite trick of selling the bare ass of the regime as an ass-wear. Political correctness remains an ideal, an artifact of our times, but it is devised to cover the inherent principles of a general type of reigning strategy. Thus, we touch upon another of its effects: it helps in the articulation of the actual regimes, in their differentiation from the “shadows of the past”; first, it sets them above all practices of the past, and then, it sets them back in history, helps in the affiliation with the wanted historical sequence, with a wanted tradition. Political correctness as an ideal and a manner, the latter attribute, certainly calls for further considerations.
1 A great number of references can be found on the Internet, many oh which debate the appearance and the genealogy of the term. The policy of political correctness is often equated with liberalism, Cultural Marxism, and mostly by conservatives; in the discussion that follows, the term will be discussed in its narrowest sense.